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ARE THERE REALLY TWO SIDES OF THE CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION COIN? THE APPLICATION OF THE BROADEST 
REASONABLE INTERPRETATION AT THE PTAB 
PAULA MILLER, MARIANNE TERROT, STACY LEWIS & TOM IRVING 
Abstract 
The USPTO has applied the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) 
claim construction standard during prosecution, reexamination, and other 
office proceedings for decades. The Supreme Court affirmed in Cuozzo 
Speed Technologies Inc. that BRI is also the appropriate standard for 
unexpired claims in post-grant proceedings at the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (PTAB). Leading up to Cuozzo, many parties speculated that the 
PTAB’s application of BRI might create confusion and result in 
inconsistent outcomes at the district court level. Notably, nothing in the 
America Invents Act establishes a standard of deference between PTAB 
and district court decisions. But so far, there has been minimal confusion.  
This Article explores the application of the BRI at the PTAB level and 
evaluates if there really is any difference in applying the BRI standard 
compared with the Phillips standard. This Article also discusses whether 
other distinctions, such as different evidentiary standards, or just plain 
different evidence being presented, had a greater effect than claim 
construction standards in the few cases where a district court and the 
PTAB have construed the same claim language differently.  
The Supreme Court recently affirmed the constitutionality of post-
grant proceedings at the PTAB in Oil States Energy Services, LLC. v. 
Greene’s Energy Group, LLC. However, questions of “takings,” 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has applied 
a broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) claim construction standard for 
decades. By contrast, district courts apply a deferential presumption of 
validity—the claim construction standard set out in Phillips v. AWH Corp.1 
These two standards have occasionally led to divergent outcomes when the 
validity and patentability of the same patent has been considered under the 
Phillips standard as well as under the BRI by the USPTO’s Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB), respectively.2 The Leahy–Smith America Invents 
Act of 20113 (AIA) created new proceedings for the PTAB to evaluate the 
patentability of issued claims, and such proceedings have become popular 
alternatives to district court litigation, further highlighting the differences 
in the two venues.4 The AIA establishes no deference between PTAB and 
district court decisions, and, moreover, does not even state if the PTAB 
would be bound by a district court order, or vice versa.5 
Under the Phillips standard, claims are construed according to the 
“ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term.”6 To determine the 
meaning of a claim term, “the court looks to ‘those sources available to the 
public that show what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 
 
 1.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 2.  For example, in PPC Broadband, the Federal Circuit found the claim construction standard 
was outcome determinative. Compare PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, 
815 F.3d 734, 742 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding the construction of the term “continuity member” under the 
Phillips standard requires “consistent or continuous contact with the coupler/nut and the post to 
establish an electrical connection”), with id. at 743 (finding the construction under the BRI had no 
requirement of consistent or continuous contact, and thus the Board’s construction was broader than the 
construction under Phillips). 
 3.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 4.  Alana Canfield Mannige, The Standard of Review for Claim Construction in Inter Partes 
Review, 8 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 157, 159 (2016); William Hannah, Major Change, New 
Chapter: How Inter Partes Review and Post Grant Review Proceedings Created by the America Invents 
Act Will Shape Litigation Strategies, 17 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 27, 39–44 (2012). 
 5.  See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1297, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 6.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. 
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understood disputed claim language to mean.’”7 Those sources include “the 
words of the claim themselves, the remainder of the specification, the 
prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific 
principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.”8 BRI 
also construes claims according to the ordinary and customary meaning as 
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.9 
BRI also looks to the specification and gives claim terms the broadest 
reasonable construction, given the specification.10 The Federal Circuit has 
stated, “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term may be the 
same as, or broader than, the construction of a term under the Phillips 
standard. But it cannot be narrower.”11 One reason given by the USPTO for 
using BRI is that the applicant can amend the claims during prosecution. 
Examining a claim according to its BRI reduces the possibility that the 
claim will later be interpreted more broadly than is justified.12 The PTAB 
generally determines patentability based on whether it is more likely than 
not that a patent claim is unpatentable—a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.13 In contrast, patents reviewed by district courts have a 
presumption of validity, and clear and convincing evidence must be used to 
overcome the presumption.14 If a district court, after using the claim 
construction tools available under the Phillips standard, finds a claim is 
ambiguous, cases hold that a court generally should construe the claim to 
 
 7.  Id. at 1314 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 
1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See, e.g., Adidas AG v. Nike, Inc., IPR2013-00067, Paper 18, at 10 (P.T.A.B. May 17, 2013); 
In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. 
 10.  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111 (Rev. 9, 2018) (“The broadest 
reasonable interpretation does not mean the broadest possible interpretation. Rather, the meaning given 
to a claim term must be consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the term (unless the 
term has been given a special definition in the specification), and must be consistent with the use of the 
claim term in the specification and drawings. Further, the broadest reasonable interpretation of the 
claims must be consistent with the interpretation that those skilled in the art would reach.”); see also In 
re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The correct inquiry in giving a claim term 
its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is not whether the specification 
proscribes or precludes some broad reading of the claim term adopted by the examiner. And it is not 
simply an interpretation that is not inconsistent with the specification. It is an interpretation that 
corresponds with what and how the inventor describes his invention in the specification, i.e., an 
interpretation that is ‘consistent with the specification.’”). 
 11.  Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 12.  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111 (Rev. 9, 2018) (citing In re Yamamoto, 
740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re 
Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404–05 (C.C.P.A. 1969)). 
 13.  See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2014). 
 14.  See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2011). 
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preserve its validity.15 The PTAB does not apply this doctrine, but instead 
applies the broadest of otherwise equally acceptable constructions.16 
I. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
In 2016, the Supreme Court affirmed the PTAB’s use of the BRI 
standard in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee.17 Before Cuozzo, 
parties noted that the PTAB’s application of BRI had the potential for 
producing results inconsistent with district court litigation outcomes.18 
Among others, several large corporations filed a joint amicus brief 
challenging the PTAB’s application of BRI in post-grant proceedings, 
arguing that “[u]sing different standards to construe the claims of issued 
patents creates uncertainty as well as opportunities for gamesmanship.”19 
Also before Cuozzo was decided, bills were introduced in both the House 
and Senate to change the PTAB’s claim construction standard to align with 
the district court’s deferential standard,20 and several law review articles 
advocated for unifying the standards.21 Other corporations, scholars, and 
amici supported the difference, noting that no presumption of validity 
exists when the agency reviews its own granted patents.22 Cuozzo generally 
 
 15.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The applicability of 
this preservation-of-validity doctrine “depends on the strength of the inference that the PTO would have 
recognized that one claim interpretation would render the claim invalid, and that the PTO would not 
have issued the patent assuming that to be the proper construction of the term.” Id. As relevant 
background, a patent claim that is ambiguous may also be invalid for indefiniteness. 35 U.S.C. § 112 
(2011). The indefiniteness analysis considers the claim as a whole, not just each claim term. MANUAL 
OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173 (Rev. 9, 2018) (citing Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 
216 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Larsen, 10 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 16.   SAP Am. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., CBM2012-00001, Paper 70, at 17 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 
2013) (the Office explained the requirement “as requiring the use of the broadest reasonable 
interpretation, as opposed to the district court standard of construing to preserve validity.”); RF 
Controls, LLC v. A-1 Packaging Sols., Inc., IPR2015-00119, Paper 10, at 8–9 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2015) 
(“In an inter partes proceeding there is no presumption of validity, therefore, we will not be applying a 
rule of construction with an aim to preserve the validity of claims.”). 
 17.  136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
 18.  See, e.g., id. at 2146 (Cuozzo argued “that the use of the broadest reasonable construction 
standard in inter partes review, together with use of an ordinary meaning standard in district court, may 
produce inconsistent results and cause added confusion.”). 
 19.  Brief for Neither Party as Amici Curiae at 6, Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 
F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 2014-1194). 
 20.  H.R. 5360, 113th Cong. § 3308 (2014); S. 1720, 113th Cong. § 7 (2013). 
 21.  See, e.g., Mannige, supra note 4, at 178–79; see also Julian Pymento, Let’s Be Reasonable! 
The Broadest Reasonable Interpretation in the PTAB, 5 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 406, 406, 
435–36 (2016). 
 22.  See, e.g., Brief of Dell Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 19, 21, Cuozzo 
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) (No. 15-446), 2016 WL 1319652, at *19, *21; Brief 
of Amicus Curiae Unified Patents Inc. in Support of Respondent at 4, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. 
Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) (No. 15-446), 2016 WL 1298289, at *4. 
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muted these disputes by affirming that the PTAB and the courts could 
continue to apply different standards.23  
Though the potential for inconsistent results was broadly discussed, 
the reality has been that the PTAB and district courts have largely produced 
uniform results on validity and patentability using the different claim 
construction standards.24 The PTAB has clarified that it is not bound by 
district court constructions, citing the different claim construction standards 
applicable.25 The PTAB has also acknowledged prior district court 
constructions without addressing the claim construction standards.26 Yet, 
the PTAB has often considered a district court construction as persuasively 
authoritative. At times, the PTAB has even adopted the exact same 
construction after determining it was consistent with BRI.27  
In Cisco Systems Inc. v. AIP Acquisition LLC,28 a PTAB panel 
evaluated a patent under both standards. The PTAB instituted review of the 
claims prior to the patent’s expiration and provided a preliminary claim 
construction for three terms based on BRI.29 The PTAB and the parties then 
discussed that the patent was likely to expire before the final written 
decision.30 The PTAB determined that based on the record, the claim 
construction of the three terms would be the same under “the rule of 
construction similar to that applied by the district courts.”31 
There have been rare instances when the PTAB adopted a standard 
that diverged from a previous district court construction.32 For example, in 
 
 23.  Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016). 
 24.  See, e.g., Joshua Landau, Letter to House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property and the Internet, COMPUT. & COMMC’NS INDUS. ASS’N (Nov. 13, 2017), 
http://www.ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Subcommittee-Letter-Re-Malone-Data.pdf 
(“PTAB only rarely disagrees with the federal courts when both review the validity of the same 
patent.”).  
 25.  See Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Depomed, Inc., IPR2014-00654, Paper 69, at 9 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 21, 
2015) (“Given our different claim construction standard, however, we are not bound by the prior district 
court constructions or any alleged agreements between the parties made in district court.”). 
 26.  See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Green’s Energy Grp., LLC, No. 16-712, slip op. at 
5, 584 U.S. __ (2018) (“The Board acknowledged the District Court’s contrary decision [on claim 
construction], but nonetheless concluded that the claims were anticipated by the prior art.”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Oracle Corp. v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., IPR2014–01207, Paper 78, at 9 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 
29, 2016); Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., IPR2014-01544, Paper 50, at 8–9 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 
2016); Google Inc., v. Simpleair Inc., CBM2014-00054, Paper 19, at 11 (P.T.A.B. May 13, 2014); 
Kyocera Corp. v. Softview, LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 53, at 7–8 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2014). 
 28.  IPR2014-00247, Paper 14, at 12–18 (P.T.A.B. May 27, 2014). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Cisco Sys. Inc. v. AIP Acquisition LLC, IPR2014-00247, Paper 17, at 3 (P.T.A.B. June 26, 
2014). 
 31.  IPR2014-00247, Paper 20, at 3 (P.T.A.B. July 10, 2014). 
 32.  See, e.g., Vibrant Media Inc. v. Gen. Elec., Co., IPR2013-00170, Paper 14 (P.T.A.B. July 29, 
2013). 
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Rackspace Hosting v. Rotatable Technologies, a district court had 
determined, based on the specification, that the claim language “computer 
display window” would include a graphical user interface (GUI).33 
However, the PTAB found this was not explicit in the specification, and 
instead looked to a technical dictionary definition to determine that the 
claimed phrase should be construed as “a division of a display screen in 
which a set of information is displayed.”34 As the PTAB’s construction 
required no GUI, additional prior art applied in the PTAB’s review that did 
not apply in the district court.35 This difference did not necessarily stem 
from a difference in the two standards, but could be seen as having 
stemmed from different readings of the specification. Both the PTAB and 
the district court looked to the same specification to define “computer 
display window,” but the PTAB concluded that the specification provided 
no definition for that term. The difference could also have come from 
neither party advocating for a construction that included a GUI in the inter 
partes review (IPR) proceeding, while both parties at the district court level 
included a GUI in their proposed constructions.36  
In Apple Inc. v. Virnetx Inc., the patent owner proposed a construction 
of the phrase “secure domain name service” that included recognizing that 
a message is requesting secure computer access, while the petitioner 
proposed a construction without that requirement.37 The patent owner 
argued that it had disclaimed embodiments without the “recognizing” 
requirement during prosecution, and those disclaimers should limit claim 
construction.38 However, the PTAB found there had not been an 
 
 33.  Rotatable Techs. LLC v. Nokia, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-265-JRG, 2013 WL 3992930, at *9 (E.D. 
Tex. Aug. 2, 2013) (applying the construction “a GUI displayable on a monitor or a screen”). Rotatable 
Technologies had advocated no construction was needed and in the alternative asked that “computer 
display window” be construed as “a graphical user interface window.” Id. Nokia had proposed the 
construction “[a] GUI that is displayed on the display monitor or screen where the GUI may be sized to 
display all or only a portion of total information made available for viewing by a program.” Id. 
 34.  Rackspace Hosting, Inc. v. Rotatable Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00248, Paper 10, at 8–9 
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2013). 
 35.  Pymento, supra note 21, at 417. 
 36.  Compare Rackspace Hosting, IPR2013-00248, Paper 2, at 9–10 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 12, 2013) 
(Petitioner advocated to construe “computer display window” as “a window generated by an operating 
system or an application program”), with IPR2013-00248, Paper 9, at 6 (P.T.A.B. July 18, 2013) (Patent 
Owner advocated that there was no need to further define “computer display window” the term beyond 
its plain and ordinary meaning, and did not provide a construction). Patent owner Rotatable 
Technologies consistently advocated that no construction of the term was needed, but before the district 
court had argued in the alternative that if a construction was provided, that it included a GUI. See 
Rotatable Techs. LLC v. Nokia, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-265-JRG, 2013 WL 3992930, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 
2, 2013). The opposing party in the district court, Nokia, had also included a GUI in their proposed 
construction. Id. 
 37.  IPR2014-00481, Paper 35, at 14–15 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 24, 2015). 
 38.  Id. at 20–21, 25. 
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unequivocal disclaimer requiring incorporation of the “recognize” 
function.39 The PTAB also reviewed the claim, the specification,40 and the 
record before the district court.41 The district court had construed that 
phrase with the “recognizing” requirement, though the patent owner had 
argued before the district court for a construction without that 
requirement—the opposite of what it later argued before the Board.42 The 
PTAB adopted the petitioner’s proposed construction, a broader 
construction than the district court had adopted.43 The PTAB noted that the 
record before it was distinct from the district court’s, the construction 
followed the patent owner’s earlier arguments, and the construction 
followed the specification.44 The patent owner’s inadequate and 
inconsistent arguments affected the PTAB’s construction. The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s claim constructions on appeal.45  
A review of case citations in IPR proceedings applying the BRI 
between February 2015 and February 2016 found that the BRI cases were 
still “largely citing legal authority that originates from the Phillips regime,” 
over 90% of the PTAB’s final written decisions applied legal standards 
derived exclusively, or partially, from the Phillips regime.46 The author of 
the review concludes that the two claim construction standards appear to 
have converged in practice “due to the inherent ambiguities in 
interpretation or litigant behavior rather than a difference between the legal 
standards.”47 
 
 39.  Id. at 19. 
 40.  Id. at 15–16. 
 41.  Id. at 24–25. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 26. 
 44.  Id. at 25. 
 45.  Virnetx Inc. v. Apple Inc., 671 F. App’x 786, 787 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 46.  Laura E. Dolbow, A Distinction Without a Difference: Convergence in Claim Construction 
Standards, 70 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1071, 1084, 1088 (2017) (“Overall, 36% of final written decisions 
cited only district court authority; 56% of final written decisions cited a mix of district court authority 
and pure PTO authority; 2% cited only pure PTO authority; and 6% contained only conclusory 
citations. Thus, over 90% of the decisions applied legal principles that derived exclusively or partially 
from the district court realm, yet only six decisions applied legal principles that derived purely from the 
PTO. Overall, data suggest that in IPR proceedings, the BRI standard functions as a circular standard 
that appears to be distinct from Phillips, yet returns to district court-originated jurisprudence for most of 
its substantive guidance.”). 
 47.  Accord id. at 1089. 
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II. OTHER FACTORS MAY HAVE A GREATER IMPACT ON 
VALIDITY/PATENTABILITY 
Claim construction can affect the ultimate outcome on 
validity/patentability. However, practitioners have suggested that where the 
PTAB and the district court reach inconsistent conclusions, the difference 
can be accredited to “additional circumstances, such as new prior art being 
presented between proceedings, a different burden of proof standard, or a 
party inadequately advocating for consistent claim constructions.”48 In an 
exemplary case, the Federal Circuit found that the different evidentiary 
standard justified the divergent outcomes. The Federal Circuit affirmed the 
validity of the patents on appeal from the district court,49 but later affirmed 
their unpatentability on appeal from the PTAB.50 The parties provided 
additional evidence to the PTAB that was not before the district court. 
Though the Federal Circuit stated it would have been “unsurprising that 
different records may lead to different findings and conclusions,” the court 
stated that different outcomes could be justified even if the record was the 
same.51 Citing Cuozzo, the Federal Circuit reiterated that different 
evidentiary burdens could result in inconsistent validity decisions.52 
The Federal Circuit stated that its decision was consistent with In re 
Baxter International, Inc., wherein the court described an aspirational 
model when it stated that the USPTO “ideally should not arrive at a 
different conclusion” if it faces the same evidence and argument as a 
district court.53 In re Baxter International involved an ex parte 
reexamination while a district court litigation was pending.54 The district 
court held that Baxter’s patent claims were valid, and the Federal Circuit 
affirmed that some claims were valid, vacating and remanding the royalty 
award.55 The district court declined to stay the litigation pending the 
USPTO reexamination.56 Prior to the district court reaching a final 
judgment, the USPTO reexamination concluded and affirmed the 
 
 48.  Miyoung Shin & Peter Lee, Finding Consistency Among Claim Construction Standards, 
LAW360 (July 20, 2016, 11:13 AM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/817773/finding-
consistency-among-claim-construction-standards. 
 49.  Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 611 F. App’x 988, 990–97 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 50.  Novartis AG v. Noven Pharm. Inc., 853 F.3d 1289, 1292–96 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 51.  Id. at 1294. 
 52.  Id. (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016)). 
 53.  Id. (quoting In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 54.  Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 55.  Id. at 1333 (citing Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 
2009)). 
 56.  Id. at 1335. 
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examiner’s determination that the patent claims would have been obvious.57 
In affirming the decision of the USPTO reexamination finding 
unpatentability of the claims, the Federal Circuit observed that the 
examiner had based the rejections on references that were not at issue at the 
district court.58 The Federal Circuit again weighed in to address the 
inconsistent outcomes, and held that its prior ruling of validity was not 
sufficiently final to preclude a cancellation of Baxter’s patent claims in the 
USPTO; thus, the pending litigation was moot.59  
CONCLUSION 
Every case has its own facts and circumstances. Despite the rare cases 
where a particular phrase has been construed differently by a district court 
and by the PTAB, in practice, the Phillips and BRI claim construction 
standards have largely produced consistent results. Even in those cases, 
differing constructions can generally be attributed to the arguments of the 
parties, rather than discord between the standards. When confronted with 
the possibility of parallel proceedings, consider both standards early in 
litigation, advancing one consistent construction.  
The Supreme Court recently handed down its decision in Oil States 
Energy Services, LLC. v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, upholding, at least 
narrowly, the constitutionality of post-grant proceedings at the PTAB.60 
There may still be open issues, however, on questions of “takings,” 
“retroactive application,” and “due process” that remain to be resolved.61  




 57.  Id. (citing Ex parte Baxter Int’l, Inc., Appeal 2009-006493, 2010 WL 1048980, at *17 
(B.P.A.I. Mar. 18, 2010)). 
 58.  Id. (citing In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1365–66). 
 59.  Id. at 1341, 1347. 
 60.  No. 16-712, slip op. at 16–17, 584 U.S. __ (2018). 
 61.  Id. at 17. 
